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Abstract
When the costs of acquiring knowledge outweigh the benefits of possessing it, igno‑
rance is rational. In this paper I clarify and explore a related but more neglected 
phenomenon: cases in which ignorance is motivated by the anticipated costs of pos‑
sessing knowledge, not acquiring it. The paper has four aims. First, I describe the 
psychological and social factors underlying this phenomenon of motivated igno‑
rance. Second, I describe those conditions in which it is instrumentally rational. 
Third, I draw on evidence from the social sciences to argue that this phenomenon of 
rational motivated ignorance plays an important but often unappreciated role in one 
of the most socially harmful forms of ignorance today: voter ignorance of societal 
risks such as climate change. Finally, I consider how to address the high social costs 
associated with rational motivated ignorance.
Keywords Ignorance · Motivated ignorance · Rational ignorance · Democracy · 
Motivated cognition · Voter ignorance
We know some men will not read a letter which is supposed to bring ill news; 
and many men forbear to cast up their accounts, or so much as think upon 
their estates, who have reason to fear their affairs are in no very good pos‑
ture. How men… can satisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance, I cannot tell: 
but methinks they have a low opinion of their souls… (Locke [1689] 1976, p. 
576).
Genuine ignorance can be an advantage to a player if it is recognized and taken 
into account by an opponent (Schelling 1960, p. 161).
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1 Introduction
“All men, by nature, desire to know,” declares the opening line of Aristotle’s Met-
aphysics (Ross 1924, p. 255). Without qualification, of course, the statement is 
absurd. The set of possible knowledge is infinite. We must be selective. Very often, 
for example, the costs of acquiring knowledge outweigh the benefits of possessing it. 
This phenomenon of rational ignorance embodies a simple idea that has neverthe‑
less had a large impact in the social sciences (Somin 2015). For example, Downs 
(1957) famously appealed to rational ignorance to explain the shocking levels of 
ignorance among voters in contemporary democracies. Because an individual’s 
vote has a negligible impact on political decision‑making, the costs of becoming 
informed massively outweigh the benefits of being informed. The upshot, argued 
Downs, is that most voters remain radically—and rationally—ignorant about matters 
of fact that would seem to be highly relevant to the issues that they vote on.
In this paper I focus on a related phenomenon that has received less attention in 
philosophy and the social sciences: cases in which an individual remains ignorant 
because of the anticipated costs of possessing knowledge, not acquiring it. Consider 
a puzzling example: many individuals who are at risk for Huntington’s disease and 
HIV refuse to take free, accurate and anonymous tests (Oster et al. 2013). As a result, 
they remain ignorant of knowledge that they could easily possess—knowledge, in 
fact, that would seem to be of immense practical value. This phenomenon—I will 
call it “motivated ignorance”—generates a variety of questions that have received 
insufficient attention in philosophy and the psychological and social sciences.1 What 
does it involve? Under what conditions, if any, is it rational? How widespread is it? I 
have two primary aims in this paper: first, to develop an account of motivated igno‑
rance that addresses such questions; second, to argue that a rational form of moti‑
vated ignorance plays an important but often unappreciated role in the high levels of 
voter ignorance in contemporary democracies. That is, a substantial component of 
this ignorance is a response to the costs of being informed, not becoming informed.2
I structure the paper as follows. In Sect. 2 I introduce motivated ignorance and 
I describe the psychological and social factors that underlie it. In Sect. 3 I outline 
those conditions in which motivated ignorance is instrumentally rational, and I con‑
sider how it relates to self‑deception. In Sect. 4 I draw on evidence from the social 
sciences to argue that rational motivated ignorance plays an important role in one of 
the most socially harmful forms of ignorance today: voter ignorance of societal risks 
1 Important exceptions in philosophy include critical philosophers of race (e.g. Mills 2007) and feminist 
philosophers (e.g. Frye 1983) who have focused on the way in which members of elite demographic 
groups benefit from socio‑political structures that uphold ignorance (see Woomer 2019), as well as 
recent philosophical work on ‘willful’ ignorance (Lynch 2016; Wieland 2016a) and ‘strategic’ ignorance 
(Wieland 2016b). Important exceptions in psychology and behavioural economics include Golman et al. 
(2015), Hertwig and Engel (2016) and Sweeny et al. (2010). Thagard (2013) uses the term “motivated 
ignorance”.
2 I use “being informed” and “becoming informed” as synonyms for “possessing knowledge” and 
“acquiring knowledge,” respectively, throughout.
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such as climate change. Finally, I conclude in Sect. 5 by exploring how to combat 
the practical incentives that place knowledge and rational self‑interest in conflict.
2  Motivated ignorance
What is motivated ignorance? Popular culture is replete with expressions that 
describe or allude to it: “denial,” “burying your head in the sand,” “ignorance is 
bliss,” “what you don’t know can’t hurt you,” “turning a blind eye,” and so on. This 
suggests a widespread familiarity with the phenomenon. In this section I seek to 
clarify what this phenomenon involves, and I identify important subcategories of it.
As noted above, motivated ignorance should first be distinguished from what I 
will call “acquisitional ignorance,” the act of maintaining one’s ignorance because 
the anticipated costs of becoming informed outweigh the anticipated benefits of 
being informed. Acquisitional ignorance is a simple consequence of the fact that 
we are finite creatures with limited time, energy and resources. Acquiring knowl‑
edge therefore has costs—both opportunity costs and the various costs involved 
in the process of acquisition. When an individual avoids some particular body of 
knowledge in response to such acquisitional costs, she exhibits acquisitional igno‑
rance. In much of social science, it is assumed that the benefits of knowledge are 
purely instrumental, such that new information is only valuable to the extent that it 
improves our decisions (Stigler 1961). Much of our concern with knowledge does 
not have this character, however. For example, we often learn about things simply 
because we find them intrinsically interesting. Nevertheless, the benefits of potential 
knowledge—instrumental or otherwise—are almost always dwarfed by the costs of 
acquisition. Even Aristotle was selective about the knowledge he sought to acquire.
Motivated ignorance involves a form of ignorance that is driven not by the costs 
of acquiring knowledge but by an active aversion to possessing it. Golman et  al. 
(2017, p. 97) call this active information avoidance and they argue that for igno‑
rance to be “active” in this way it must satisfy two conditions: “(1) the individual 
is aware that the information is available, and (2) the individual has free access to 
the information or would avoid the information even if access were free.” The first 
condition flags something important that plausibly applies to acquisitional ignorance 
as well: ignorance is only ever a choice in cases in which the individual is aware that 
potential knowledge exists. When one lacks this awareness, one’s ignorance is nei‑
ther acquisitional nor motivated but merely “inadvertent” (Somin 2015). The second 
condition, however, is used to distinguish acquisitional ignorance from active infor‑
mation avoidance: individuals exhibiting active information avoidance would still 
remain ignorant even if the acquisitional costs pertaining to a body of knowledge 
were eliminated.
How should active information avoidance be understood? In using the term 
“motivated ignorance,” I am drawing a deliberate connection between this phenom‑
enon and what is often called “motivated reasoning” in contemporary psychology. 
Motivated reasoning is the well‑established “tendency to conform information pro‑
cessing to some goal collateral to accuracy” (Kahan 2017a, p. 1). Motivated reason‑
ers thus deploy their reasoning abilities “to arrive at conclusions that they want to 
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arrive at,” rather than those conclusions that are most likely to be true in light of 
the evidence available to them (Kunda 1990, p. 480). With some important quali‑
fications (see below), motivated ignorance can be understood as one manifestation 
of this tendency. Whereas motivated reasoning is typically understood to involve 
a “motivation to arrive at particular conclusions” (Kunda 1990, p. 480), however, 
motivated ignorance involves the opposite motivation: to avoid certain conclusions. 
Nevertheless, there is an obvious symbiosis between these phenomena: insofar as 
one is motivated to arrive at conclusions for reasons independent of their truth, one 
will likewise be motivated to avoid acknowledging the truth of propositions in ten‑
sion with such conclusions. Motivated reasoning thus inevitably gives rise to moti‑
vated ignorance.
There are several important clarifications and caveats that must be attached to this 
simple story, however. First, motivated ignorance need not involve the motivation to 
avoid “particular conclusions,” at least if this is taken to involve knowledge of the 
specific content of those conclusions (Kunda 1990, p. 480). In many cases of moti‑
vated ignorance, the individual is unaware of the specific content of the information 
that she seeks to avoid. For example, if I avoid opening a letter because I fear that it 
brings bad news, I am likely ignorant of its specific contents. The relevant motiva‑
tion is thus plausibly to avoid beliefs that generate psychologically unpleasant or 
distressing states, which combines in this case with my expectation that reading the 
letter is likely to give rise to beliefs with this aversive character.
Second, it is plausibly an essential component of motivated reasoning as it is 
described in the psychological literature that one is consciously unaware of the role 
that one’s motives play in biasing one’s cognitive processes. That is, motivated rea‑
soning is accompanied by a powerful illusion of impartiality, such that “people do 
not realize that the [reasoning] process is biased by their goals” (Kunda 1990, p. 
486). Although many examples of motivated ignorance share this character—for 
example, an individual in denial is typically not aware that she is in denial—many 
others do not. I might be very much aware of the fact that I am not opening a let‑
ter because I fear that it brings bad news. My motivation and its effects are thus 
transparent to me. Nevertheless, I am still exhibiting motivated ignorance. I return in 
more depth to this important issue of the role of self‑knowledge in motivated igno‑
rance in Sect. 3.
Third, it is common within philosophy to distinguish between intentional agency 
and merely motivated behaviour (Mele 2001), and motivated reasoning is often 
understood to be restricted to the latter. Crucially, motivated ignorance as I will 
understand it is consistent with—although does not require—maximal agency and 
all that this entails, including intentions, effort, control, deliberation and so on (see 
Funkhouser 2019, pp. 120–121).
Finally, motivated ignorance need not be restricted to cases in which one’s moti‑
vations influence the process of explicit reasoning. In many cases, for example, the 
agent’s motive—perhaps in combination with an intention and conscious delibera‑
tion—simply drives her to avoid certain information altogether, as with someone 
who avoids taking a medical test because she is afraid of discovering the results. 
More generally, motivated ignorance can be sustained by a complex panoply of cog‑
nitive and behavioural processes, from simple forms of physical avoidance to biased 
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belief updating, selective recall, rationalisation and more. Woomer (2019, p. 73) 
helpfully characterises “the kind of non‑knowing at the heart of ignorance that is 
cultivated or maintained by individual agents” as a form of agential insensitivity, 
which manifests “as a failure to either attend to relevant and available evidence, or 
appropriately interpret evidence that is attended to.”3 What matters in classifying a 
state of ignorance as motivated is that the individual’s motives are causally respon‑
sible for this state of agential insensitivity. How such motives exert this causal influ‑
ence is a separate question, and often an extremely complicated one.
To summarise, then, motivated ignorance involves any motivated process that 
enables an individual to avoid acquiring some specific body of knowledge, where 
this motivation has nothing to do with the costs of acquiring that knowledge. Of 
course, this is a maximally general description. I will now show how this phenom‑
enon can be decomposed into different subcategories.
2.1  Forms of motivated ignorance
There are many ways in which one can taxonomize different forms of motivated 
ignorance.4 One crucial distinction that must be made in any such taxonomy, how‑
ever, is between what I will call personally motivated ignorance and socially moti-
vated ignorance, even if—as I argue below—both phenomena often co‑exist in sin‑
gle cases.
Personally motivated ignorance involves cases in which the agent is motivated 
to remain ignorant for reasons independent of the effects of this ignorance on other 
agents. Two examples of this phenomenon are especially important (see Sweeny 
et al. 2010). First, one can be motivated to avoid knowledge in the service of emo‑
tional regulation. Knowledge often leads to distressing or aversive emotional states 
such as shame, regret, jealousy, embarrassment and so on. One way to avoid such 
negative emotional experiences is thus to avoid acquiring information that might 
lead to them. Second, one can be motivated to avoid knowledge that leads to unde‑
sirable actions. For example, consider an individual in denial about her spouse’s 
infidelity because recognising this infidelity would “force” her, given her other 
beliefs and desires, to leave the relationship—an outcome that she desperately wants 
to avoid. The generic motive to avoid certain actions can thus motivate avoidance of 
any knowledge that might lead one to undertake them.
Socially motivated ignorance involves cases in which the agent is motivated to 
remain ignorant because of the anticipated effects of this ignorance on other agents. 
At least one example of this form of motivated ignorance has been extensively 
studied in game theory and it forms the basis of the second epigraph to this paper: 
Schelling’ (1960, p. 161) remark that “ignorance can be an advantage to a player if it 
is recognized and taken into account by an opponent.” In such cases the motivation 
3 Woomer (2019) also explicitly links this phenomenon of agential insensitivity to work on motivated 
reasoning in psychology.
4 See Golman et al. (2015), Hertwig and Engel (2016) and Sweeny et al. (2010) for different ways of 
taxonomizing a similar phenomenon.
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to remain ignorant is driven by the motivation to persuade other agents of one’s 
ignorance, which is the real goal. Perhaps the most obvious real‑world examples of 
socially motivated ignorance are cases in which individuals attempt to avoid social 
or legal accountability by avoiding the knowledge that would bestow such account‑
ability on them. As Simon (2004, p. 2) puts it, “Because both law and social opin‑
ion hesitate to condemn…ignorant conduct, actors are tempted to affect… deliber‑
ate ignorance in order to diminish accountability.” Those involved in the Watergate 
scandal, for example, revealed “intense faith in the immunizing power of deliberate 
ignorance” (Simon 2004, p. 5).
As I mentioned above, paradigmatic examples of motivated reasoning involve 
cases in which the individual harbours a desire to arrive at certain conclusions—
to form certain beliefs. In the vocabulary of rational choice theory, agents have 
preferences over beliefs, leading them to seek out and process information in ways 
designed to satisfy such belief‑based preferences (Bénabou and Tirole 2016).5 Such 
“cherished beliefs” inevitably give rise to a form of motivated ignorance: the moti‑
vation to remain ignorant of the truth of propositions in tension with them (Sweeny 
et al. 2010). Should this form of motivated ignorance be understood as personally or 
socially motivated ignorance?
The answer to this question depends on why the relevant agent cherishes the 
belief. If one values a belief for reasons independent of its effects on other agents, 
the motivated ignorance that results will be an example of personally motivated 
ignorance. Motivated reasoning often has this purely personal character. In wish‑
ful thinking, for example, one desires to believe that p because one desires that p. 
If such beliefs motivate one to avoid or distort information that challenges them, 
one’s ignorance will be a case of personally motivated ignorance. In some cases, 
however, agents are motivated to hold beliefs because other agents respond to such 
beliefs in a desirable way. That is, such beliefs are “cherished” because they are 
socially rewarded (Kurzban 2012; von Hippel and Trivers 2011; Williams 2018). 
For example, certain beliefs function as badges of group membership, enabling us to 
signal our membership of and loyalty to desirable coalitions—a phenomenon that I 
return to in Sect. 4.6 If such socially adaptive beliefs (Williams 2019) motivate one 
to avoid or distort information in tension with them, one’s ignorance will be a case 
of socially motivated ignorance.
Although this distinction between personally and socially motivated ignorance 
is conceptually clear, it is often difficult to distinguish or disentangle them in real‑
world contexts. Consider an infamous example: many bystanders throughout the 
Holocaust sought to remain ignorant of the atrocities being committed in their com‑
munities (Bankier 1996). Was this motivated ignorance socially strategic—a way of 
avoiding potential accountability to enemy forces who might discover such crimes—
or a way of protecting their own consciences, or both? We will likely never know. 
5 Here I assume that the preferences concern beliefs, and not the states of affairs those beliefs represent, 
in line with so‑called “mind‑directed” theories of self‑deception (see Funkhouser 2019, pp. 59–64; Nel‑
kin 2002) (see Sect. 3.1 for a discussion of self‑deception).
6 See Funkhouser (2017) on beliefs as signals.
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In general, it is often difficult to tease apart different motivations for ignorance, not 
least because multiple motives can and often do co‑exist and complement each other 
in individual cases.
3  Rational motivated ignorance
Is motivated ignorance rational? Importantly, my interest here is in whether it is 
instrumentally rational—that is, whether it enables individuals to successfully 
achieve their own ends. Motivated ignorance is of course often epistemically irra‑
tional, insofar as it involves forms of information sampling and processing that 
obstruct the production of knowledge.78 Further, it can also plausibly be unethical if 
the relevant individual’s motivated ignorance inflicts costs on others, although I will 
not consider complex ethical and philosophical questions surrounding individual 
responsibility for motivated ignorance in this paper.
Intuitions about the instrumental rationality of motivated ignorance pull in oppo‑
site directions. Consider the character in Douglas Adams’s ‘The Restaurant at the 
End of the Universe’ who wears a pair of “Peril Sensitive Sunglasses”: “At the first 
hint of trouble, they turn totally black and thus prevent you from seeing anything that 
might alarm you” (Adams 1980, p. 27). The joke, of course, is that ignoring present 
dangers is not a sensible way of avoiding them. In fact, it exacerbates the problem, 
rendering the individual more vulnerable to potential harm. This can seem like a 
good metaphor for understanding motivated ignorance—a form of willful blindness 
that at best brings temporary relief, but can lead to devastating consequences.
On the other hand, many examples of motivated ignorance seem like manifesta‑
tions of rational self‑interest. For example, perhaps the most influential case study of 
motivated ignorance within contemporary philosophy involves situations in which 
members of elite or dominant demographic groups wilfully avoid facts about the 
lives of oppressed or marginal groups and the nature of society more generally (Frye 
1983; Mills 2007; Woomer 2019). This ignorance is widely thought to be strate‑
gically self‑serving, enabling members of such privileged groups to preserve psy‑
chologically comforting illusions and avoid accountability. Insofar as the putatively 
ignorant members of such groups value these self‑interested outcomes over ethical 
ones, their ignorance is plausibly instrumentally rational.
Is there a way to move beyond intuitions and identify the specific conditions that 
a case of motivated ignorance must satisfy to qualify as instrumentally rational? 
7 An anonymous reviewer points out that it is controversial within epistemology that behaviour can be 
both epistemically irrational and yet instrumentally rational. Nevertheless, I assume along with main‑
stream psychology (e.g. Stanovich 2011) and much of philosophy (e.g. Bortolotti 2014) both a sharp 
conceptual distinction between the two forms of rationality and the possibility of information processing 
that is systematically biased away from truth (and thus epistemically irrational) and yet conducive to an 
individual’s goals and interests (and so instrumentally rational).
8 It may be that the mere avoidance of information is not sufficient for epistemic irrationality, such that 
not all examples of motivated ignorance are epistemically irrational. I thank an anonymous reviewer for 
pointing this out.
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To approach this question, it is first useful to focus on the simpler case of acquisi‑
tional ignorance. Acquisitional ignorance has been a central focus in the economics 
of information since the seminal work of Stigler (1961). By assuming the truth of 
certain axioms of rational choice, however, this work typically simply assumes that 
acquisitional ignorance is rational. Specifically, it assumes that acquisitional igno‑
rance is driven by a form of expected utility maximization in which agents acquire 
information only up to the point where its expected marginal benefits are identical 
with its expected marginal costs. Nevertheless, one might use this framework not as 
a description of all actual decision‑making but as the normative benchmark against 
which to evaluate the rationality of any given case of acquisitional ignorance: does 
the agent’s decision to remain ignorant maximize expected utility?
Of course, people do not engage in the complex calculations relevant to expected 
utility maximization when they decide to avoid acquiring knowledge. Indeed, to do 
so in almost all circumstances would itself be irrational given the time and energy it 
would take (Somin 2015). Instead, most of the judgements and decisions that guide 
acquisitional ignorance are “intuitive”: like almost all judgements and decisions 
that we make, they arise not from any process of conscious rational deliberation but 
from a complex array of heuristics, habits, emotions and other automatic processes 
(Kahneman 2003). Nevertheless, one might still ask to what extent our decision‑
making in such cases approximates expected utility maximization. In essence, this 
just boils down to the following question: is the agent’s choice to remain ignorant 
sufficiently responsive to her interests—to the actual costs and benefits involved? 
Rational acquisitional ignorance does not require infallibility. As Somin (2015, p. 
275) puts it, “Even the most rational individual might choose not to seek out infor‑
mation that in retrospect turns out to have been worth the cost of acquiring.” To 
qualify as rational, however, it must be the case that the agent forms her judgement 
concerning the relative costs and benefits in a way that is sensitive to the range of 
relevant evidence at her disposal. In other words, whether acquisitional ignorance 
is instrumentally rational depends on whether the relevant agent came to judge the 
costs and benefits involved—even if only implicitly—in a way that was epistemi-
cally rational.
One might think that this intuitive framework will carry over straightforwardly 
to the case of motivated ignorance. Of course, acquisitional ignorance concerns the 
costs of acquiring knowledge whereas motivated ignorance concerns the costs of 
possessing it, but a similar lesson would seem to apply: an act of motivated igno‑
rance is rational if and only if the agent’s decision to remain ignorant is sufficiently 
responsive to her evidence concerning the costs and benefits of possessing the rel‑
evant body of knowledge. Again, such decisions are rarely underpinned by a con‑
scious process of cost/benefit analysis, but one can still ask to what extent they are 
responsive to the agent’s interests as manifest in the evidence at her disposal.
Nevertheless, motivated ignorance introduces a complication not found in acqui‑
sitional ignorance: in many cases of motivated ignorance, the subject is consciously 
oblivious to her motivation to remain ignorant. Indeed, many of those engaging in 
motivated ignorance will adamantly reject attempts to explain their epistemic posi‑
tion in terms of motivated ignorance. Paradigmatic cases of denial provide a clear 
example. An individual in denial about the destructive consequences of her drug 
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use is not typically aware that she is in denial (Pickard 2016). In this way denial 
typically exhibits a kind of second‑order motivated ignorance: in addition to the ini‑
tial motivation to remain ignorant of a body of knowledge, it plausibly involves a 
second‑order motivation to remain ignorant of that initial motivation.
Not all examples of motivated ignorance exhibit this lack of self‑knowledge. 
Consider a labour union leader who deliberately avoids polling workers about their 
willingness to accept an offer from management, thus giving the impression of 
uncertainty about the strength of worker grievances and thereby improving her bar‑
gaining position (Golman et al. 2017, p. 105). This is a calculated form of socially 
motivated ignorance in which the relevant agent is consciously aware of her motive. 
An individual in denial about her spouse’s infidelity is in a very different situation: 
although her state of ignorance is sustained by her motives, she is—at least in para‑
digm cases—consciously unaware of this fact. It is these examples of what I will call 
unconscious motivated ignorance that are difficult to understand as instrumentally 
rational: how can an agent’s choice to remain ignorant be sensitive to her interests if 
she is consciously unaware of making that choice? It is one thing to choose to wear a 
pair of peril sensitive sunglasses. It is quite another to put them on without noticing.
This conclusion would be misguided, however. Of course, many examples of 
unconscious motivated ignorance are instrumentally irrational. Indeed, Alcohol-
ics Anonymous describes the form of denial that often accompanies alcoholism as 
literal “insanity” (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001, p. 37; quoted in Pickard 2016, p. 
278). Further, it is plausible that the lack of self‑knowledge partially explains this 
instrumental irrationality in certain cases. Conscious deliberation over a decision 
enables one to integrate more information in a more flexible way than is possible for 
unconscious decision‑making (Carruthers 2015), so the fact that unconscious moti‑
vated ignorance does not allow for such deliberation might generate important con‑
straints that are absent in conscious forms of motivated ignorance.
Nevertheless, it is implausible that the possibility of conscious deliberation is 
necessary for instrumental rationality given how much of decision making occurs in 
the absence of such deliberation. It is widely held in contemporary psychology that 
unconscious motivated psychological processes can be highly sensitive to an indi‑
vidual’s objective interests (Kurzban 2012; Von Hippel and Trivers 2011). Indeed, 
rendering certain motivations and the processes that they give rise to unconscious 
is itself plausibly strategic in many cases, preserving the conscious subject’s sense 
of impartiality and thus facilitating plausible deniability (Simler and Hanson 2017). 
That is, if ignorance can be beneficial in general, then presumably ignorance of 
one’s motives to be ignorant can also be beneficial. The rationality of unconscious 
motivated ignorance should thus not be ruled out a priori. The question is whether 
any given case of unconscious motivated ignorance is driven by psychological pro‑
cesses that are responsive to the relevant agent’s interests.9 I will argue in Sect. 4 
9 An anonymous reviewer helpfully points out that one must distinguish between short‑term and long‑
term interests here, and argues that “the (instrumental) rationality of motivated ignorance is mostly short‑
term, based on the fact that no misinformation and disinformation can be helpful in the long run either 
for the agent or for third parties.” Although I agree that motivated ignorance is often short‑sighted, I 
reject the assumption that is always so. The incentives pertaining to motivated ignorance discussed in 
Sect. 4, for example, are not changed by broadening the time horizon.
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that certain examples of unconscious motivated ignorance in the political domain 
satisfy this condition. First, however, I consider a potential objection to the forego‑
ing analysis.
3.1  Motivated ignorance and self‑deception
I have not mentioned a concept that many will think is highly relevant to the fore‑
going discussion: self‑deception. This is purposeful. Despite an enormous body of 
philosophical work on self‑deception, disagreement and controversy persist con‑
cerning every aspect of it, including what its defining characteristics are, what con‑
stitute paradigmatic examples of it, whether it exists—indeed, whether it even could 
exist—and which psychological states and processes it involves (see Funkhouser 
2019 for an excellent review). By avoiding the term “self‑deception,” I have tried 
to identify general structural characteristics of motivated ignorance whilst steering 
clear of such controversies. Of course, this is not to say that there are no interest‑
ing questions concerning how the complex philosophical terrain surrounding self‑
deception maps onto the phenomenon of motivated ignorance as I have described it, 
but I hope to postpone many of these questions to future work.
Nevertheless, there is one important issue here that cannot be postponed. Some 
philosophers have sought to draw a distinction between what they call “willful igno‑
rance” (or “willful blindness”) and self‑deception (Holton 2001; Funkhouser 2019; 
Lynch 2016). For example, Holton (2001) argues that willful ignorance is consist‑
ent with knowledge of one’s motivation to be ignorant, whereas self‑deception is 
not. Funkhouser (2019, p. 70) argues that willful ignorance involves “an absence of 
information altogether rather than the presence of unwanted information,” which he 
takes to be characteristic of self‑deception. And Lynch (2016, p. 522) agrees with 
both such differences and suggests a range of additional ones, including the presence 
of fundamentally different doxastic states, different relations to evidence, and dif‑
ferent levels of culpability, leading him to conclude that willful ignorance and self‑
deception comprise “distinct psychological kinds.”
Superficially, at least, what such authors call “willful ignorance” and “self‑decep‑
tion” seem to map onto conscious and unconscious motivated ignorance as I have 
described them. Thus, one might object that my treatment of motivated ignorance 
assimilates psychological phenomena that should in fact be kept apart for theoretical 
purposes.
Before addressing this worry, it is worth first explaining how the concepts of con‑
scious and unconscious motivated ignorance map onto self‑deception, at least as it 
is typically understood. Most obviously, conscious motivated ignorance does not—
or at least need not—involve anything resembling self‑deception. A union leader 
who intentionally avoids polling workers in order to improve her bargaining posi‑
tion need not be self‑deceived. By contrast, some examples of unconscious moti‑
vated ignorance do seem to qualify as self‑deception. An individual in denial about 
her drug problem is a clear example. More generally, self‑deception plausibly either 
just is unconscious motivated ignorance, insofar as it is driven by the motivation 
to avoid a body of knowledge, or it inevitably gives rise to unconscious motivated 
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ignorance, insofar as it is driven by a motivation to protect a cherished belief. Nev‑
ertheless, unconscious motivated ignorance need not involve various additional 
ingredients that some theorists have thought to be essential to self‑deception, includ‑
ing intentions (in addition to mere motives) and double book‑keeping (i.e. holding 
two contradictory beliefs at the same time) (see Funkhouser 2019). Thus, on certain 
accounts of self‑deception, unconscious motivated ignorance is a broader category 
than self‑deception.
What about willful ignorance? Insofar as the defining characteristic of willful 
ignorance is the presence of self‑knowledge, it maps on straightforwardly to con‑
scious motivated ignorance as I have described it. As noted above, however, Lynch 
(2016) and others posit several other defining characteristics. Although such charac‑
teristics might be collectively definitional of an interesting phenomenon in its own 
right, they are not necessary for something to qualify as conscious motivated igno‑
rance. To give only three examples:
First, Lynch (2016, pp. 511–512) argues that willful ignorance essentially 
involves ignorance of knowledge that one should possess. This normative dimen‑
sion is irrelevant to whether something qualifies as conscious motivated ignorance. 
One is under no obligation to learn the ending of a film or novel, for example, but 
one can still be consciously motivated to avoid “spoilers.” Indeed, one can be con‑
sciously motivated to remain ignorant of knowledge that one should not possess, 
such as intimate details that violate another’s privacy or effective techniques of 
criminality (Fricker 2016, p. 144).
Second, Lynch (2016, p. 509) argues that willful ignorance cannot involve 
actively believing contrary to what one remains wilfully ignorant of. This phenom‑
enon seems central to many cases of conscious motivated ignorance, however. For 
example, I might avoid taking a medical test precisely to protect my cherished belief 
that I am healthy. Lynch (2016, p. 509) rules this out in the case of willful ignorance 
for the following reason: “Calling… ignorance ‘willful’ implies that he chose to be 
ignorant by avoiding finding out whether p. But… [he] wouldn’t count as having 
avoided finding out whether p if he felt confident that not‑p already.” It is difficult to 
see the force of this consideration, however. There is nothing that is obviously inco‑
herent or even implausible in both believing that not‑p and yet actively avoiding evi‑
dence that p. Indeed, by Lynch’s (2016) own admission, this sort of tension seems to 
be central to many cases of self‑deception.
Third, Lynch (2016, p. 522) argues that willful ignorance can never involve 
encountering evidence that the proposition that one is ignorant of is true, only that 
it may be true. Once again, however, it is difficult to understand this claim in the 
case of conscious motivated ignorance. An infinite number of things may be true. It 
is unclear how evidence pertaining to a mere possibility like this could drive moti‑
vated ignorance of any kind. Further, many examples of conscious motivated igno‑
rance appear to involve much stronger evidence. An individual might consciously 
avoid taking a medical test despite displaying symptoms of the relevant illness, for 
example.
Thus, many of the allegedly defining characteristics of willful ignorance as Lynch 
(2016) understands it do not seem to be essential to conscious motivated ignorance. 
Further, I think it is plausible that the differences in self‑knowledge that distinguish 
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conscious and unconscious motivated ignorance as I have characterised them are 
best thought of as differences of degree. That is, individuals can plausibly be more 
or less aware of their motivation to be ignorant, such that differences in self‑knowl‑
edge exist along a continuum. Somebody who avoids taking a medical test might 
only dimly appreciate her motivation to be ignorant, and acknowledging that one is 
in denial is probably best thought of as a process where success and failure do not 
have sharply demarcated boundaries.
Finally, it is important to reiterate the point made above (Sect.  2.1): motivated 
ignorance can be sustained by a complex panoply of cognitive and behavioural strat‑
egies. Crucially, it is not my intention here to argue that all such strategies comprise 
a single psychological kind. There can be theoretical reasons for assimilating phe‑
nomena that do not involve a concern with psychological taxonomy. My aim here 
has been to draw attention to what unifies conscious and unconscious motivated 
ignorance from an epistemological point of view: namely, the motivation to remain 
ignorant of a body of knowledge for reasons independent of the costs of acquiring 
that knowledge. A fine‑grained psychological investigation and taxonomy of the 
myriad ways in which such motivations exert their causal influence in different cases 
falls beyond the scope of the current paper.
3.2  Summary
To summarise, whether a given case of motivated ignorance is instrumentally 
rational depends on whether it is sufficiently responsive to the agent’s interests as 
manifest in the evidence that she has at her disposal. This applies to both conscious 
motivated ignorance and unconscious motivated ignorance, which often involves 
self‑deception. Because rationality here concerns the individual’s own objectives, 
when motivated ignorance of any kind is irrational it typically harms the individual. 
For the remainder of this paper, however, I want to focus on a different phenom‑
enon: cases in which rational motivated ignorance is harmful to others. Specifically, 
I will focus on the form of ignorance with which I began this paper: voter ignorance 
in contemporary democracies.
4  Rational motivated voter ignorance
One of the most socially consequential forms of ignorance today is the ignorance 
among voters in contemporary democracies of facts and matters of scientific consen‑
sus that are relevant to political decision‑making. Of course, persistent public disa‑
greement on many political issues is both predictable and desirable, insofar as such 
disagreement reflects differences in values and the large amount of uncertainty sur‑
rounding complex political decisions. However, there is now extensive data reveal‑
ing extremely high levels of ignorance of basic matters of empirical fact around 
which there is strong scientific and expert consensus (Brennan 2016; Kahan et al. 
2010; Somin 2013). In both political philosophy and political science, it is widely 
recognised that such persistent ignorance poses a deep challenge to democracy, 
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which plausibly requires an informed electorate (Brennan 2016; Somin 2013).10 To 
take only one example—albeit an especially distressing one—many individuals are 
ignorant of the role of human activity in climate change and the various risks that it 
poses (Campbell and Kay 2014; Kahan et al. 2010). Indeed, when it comes to soci‑
etal risks in general, the core explanandum for both psychology and social science is 
simple: “Why do members of the public disagree—sharply and persistently—about 
facts on which expert scientists largely agree?” (Kahan et al. 2010, p. 147).
There is clearly no single factor at play when it comes to explaining voter igno‑
rance. Levels of ignorance are themselves highly variable among the population and 
also highly content‑specific (Brennan 2016). Nevertheless, as I noted in Sect. 1, one 
influential explanation of voter ignorance points to rational acquisitional ignorance 
(Downs 1957; Somin 2013). According to this explanation, an individual voter has 
almost no practical incentive to acquire knowledge of the issues that she votes on 
because her vote has such a negligible impact on political decision‑making.11 Given 
this, the costs of becoming informed greatly exceed the benefits of being informed. 
As Downs (1957, p. 259) puts it, “[T]he low returns from data simply do not justify 
their cost in time and other resources.”
Although this explanation is surely applicable in many circumstances, it confronts 
several problems as a general account of voter ignorance. Perhaps most importantly, 
it fails to explain why voters are often systematically misinformed.12 That is, if the 
issue is merely that voters do not expend any time or energy in acquiring politi‑
cal knowledge, one would expect their errors to be randomly distributed around the 
truth. This is rarely the case, however (Caplan 2007; Flynn et  al. 2017). Further, 
many of those holding misinformed opinions devote a large amount of time and 
energy to actively seeking out politically relevant information and engaging with the 
political process, and misinformed opinions are frequently held with high levels of 
confidence and emotional conviction—something that is difficult to understand in 
terms of acquisitional ignorance (Caplan 2001). Perhaps most mysteriously of all, 
those who diverge from expert consensus on many issues often appear to exhibit 
no worse understanding of the relevant issues than those who align with it (Kahan 
2013, 2017a, b).
To account for such phenomena, I contend that we must turn to the costs that 
attend the possession of knowledge, and not merely its acquisition. That is, a sig‑
nificant component of voter ignorance is rational motivated ignorance: voters are 
responding to the costs of being informed, and not merely the costs of becoming 
informed.13 This fact is often hidden from view, however, because the motivated 
10 Exactly how and to what extent widespread ignorance challenges democracy is a difficult question 
within normative democratic theory (see Estlund 2005) that falls beyond the scope of the current paper.
11 One explanation for why many voters are not ignorant is therefore that they assign non‑instrumental 
value to political knowledge (Brennan 2016, p. 36).
12 Although political scientists draw a distinction between ignorance and misinformation, being misin‑
formed is of course a kind of ignorance (Flynn et al. 2017).
13 See Caplan (2001, 2007), who emphasises the importance of “rational irrationality” (that is, epistemic 
irrationality that is instrumentally rational) in voter ignorance, although his emphasis is largely on the 
personal benefits that attend misguided beliefs rather than the costs that attend knowledge as such.
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ignorance central to the political domain is typically unconscious motivated igno‑
rance. Nevertheless, knowledge in the political domain often brings costs, and there 
are compelling reasons to think that individuals respond to such costs. As with reli‑
gious and ideological communities more generally, dissent from group dogmas and 
sacred propositions can issue in harmful forms of group ostracism, even when such 
heresies are best supported by the available evidence. Further, it is often painful to 
abandon deeply held political opinions and commitments, even when such abandon‑
ment is best licensed by an impartial evaluation of the facts. Drawing attention to 
such costs can help to explain how individuals exposed to a deluge of political infor‑
mation can remain both misinformed and yet passionately committed to such misin‑
formation, and why understanding of politically relevant issues is often no guarantee 
of knowledge.
For example, consider the pioneering research carried out by Dan Kahan and col‑
leagues on the causes of public ignorance of matters of societal risk such as climate 
change. As noted, the intuitive and widely held prediction that those who diverge 
from expert opinion in this area exhibit a worse understanding of the relevant sci‑
entific issues appears to be false (Kahan 2017a).14 Indeed, there is little or no posi‑
tive correlation between people’s generic scientific literacy and numeracy and the 
degree to which they align with scientific consensus on these topics. Further, those 
who score highest on so‑called “cognitive reflection tests” that measure the degree 
to which one can override intuitive judgements and engage in careful deliberative 
reasoning are most polarized on issues such as climate change, which undermines 
the idea that ignorance in this domain is caused by cost‑effective but biased “heu‑
ristics” or “System 1” thinking (Kahan 2017a). Instead, the one important thing that 
reliably correlates with ignorance concerning such issues is political identity (Kahan 
2013, 2017a, b; Kahan et al. 2010).
Given this data, Kahan (2017a) speculates that issues such as climate change 
motivate individuals to engage in identity protective cognition, conforming the 
way in which they seek out and process information to the goal of protecting their 
political‑coalitional identity rather than arriving at the truth. Specifically, because 
the positions that people take on climate change and related issues have become 
badges of coalitional affiliation and loyalty, individuals are incentivised “to attend 
to information in a manner that promotes beliefs that signal their commitment to 
the position associated with their group” (Kahan 2017a, p. 1). Although Kahan 
does not frame it in this way, this leads directly to a form of socially motivated 
ignorance. That is, identity protective cognition drives individuals who inhabit 
ideological communities where scepticism about climate change has become a 
badge of group identification to avoid acquiring any knowledge that might lead to 
exclusion or ostracism—that might lead them to lose this badge. Such knowledge 
avoidance can be sustained in various ways, including downgrading the epistemic 
authority of agents who assert identity‑inconsistent views, using reasoning to 
14 However, see (Ranney and Clark 2016), who show that giving individuals particular kinds of climate‑
specific mechanistic and statistical information does seem to increase acceptance of the existence of cli‑
mate change across the political spectrum, at least temporarily.
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find creative rationalisations for cherished beliefs, and the simple physical avoid‑
ance of identity‑inconsistent information (Kahan 2017a). Indeed, evidence sug‑
gests that political partisans will pay to avoid exposure to contrary viewpoints 
and arguments (Frimer et al. 2017), which lends strong support to the motivated 
character of such information sampling.
Importantly, the socially motivated ignorance here can be of at least two kinds. 
For some, it is clearly a consequence of the motivation to possess—and so adver‑
tise—certain beliefs because they are socially rewarded (Williams 2019). This 
corresponds most closely to Brennan’s (2016) metaphor of political “hooligans,” 
in contrast to political “hobbits” whose ignorance is largely driven by rational 
acquisitional ignorance. In addition, however, there are surely partisans of differ‑
ent political parties whose primary interest is more in avoiding their side’s con‑
demnation than in performances that express their group allegiances. Extensive 
evidence in political science suggests that political outlooks are highly condi‑
tioned by social and political identity (Achen and Bartels 2017), but, at the psy‑
chological level, at least, there are important differences between showing off and 
fitting in, between hooliganism and motivated conformity, and between actively 
signalling one’s loyalty and avoiding any cue of disloyalty.
Once again, there is no suggestion in either case that individuals are con‑
sciously aware of the role that their motives play in sustaining their ignorance 
in this domain. Indeed, most would vehemently reject this interpretation of their 
epistemic situation. In this sense the motivated ignorance that results from val‑
ued group identities and fear of group ostracism is typically—perhaps always—
unconscious. From the individual’s conscious point of view, it simply appears 
that all of the available evidence lends support to her opinions. As with para‑
digmatic forms of motivated reasoning, the fact that the individual’s motiva‑
tions played a central role in selecting and interpreting that evidence is hidden 
from view. Indeed, as suggested briefly above, the unconscious character of such 
motivations might itself be strategic, providing plausible deniability of the indi‑
vidual’s irrationality. Crucially, however, this unconscious motivated ignorance 
is still plausibly instrumentally rational. When it comes to issues such as climate 
change, individuals have little practical incentive to hold true beliefs because as 
individuals they have a negligible impact on both the climate and political deci‑
sion‑making concerning the climate. That is, the potential benefits of knowledge 
are miniscule, even if one is altruistic. By contrast, forming true beliefs can be 
extremely costly if such beliefs happen to constitute heresies in the ideological 
community that one inhabits and values. As Kahan (2017a, p. 4) puts it,
Nothing an ordinary member of the public does as consumer, as voter, or 
participant in public discourse will have any effect on the risk that climate 
change poses to her or anyone else. Same for gun control, fracking, and 
nuclear waste disposal… But given what positions on these issues signify 
about the sort of person she is, adopting a mistaken stance on one of these 
in her everyday interactions with other ordinary people could expose her to 
devastating consequences, both material and psychic.
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Of course, although this phenomenon is individually (instrumentally) rational, it 
is socially catastrophic: if a large number of people in a democracy conform the way 
in which they seek out, ignore and process information to the goal of protecting their 
coalitional identity rather than achieving knowledge, the resultant ignorance will 
then likely play an important role in political decision‑making. Further, as Kahan’s 
quote illustrates, this basic phenomenon applies to many more cases beyond climate 
change. In fact, the basic dynamic will apply whenever the acquisition of knowledge 
is heretical and thus socially punished on the grounds that unjustified beliefs func‑
tion as signals of coalitional membership and belonging. Given what we know about 
the history of politically relevant coalitions (religions, economic classes, political 
parties, ethnic groups, etc.), this situation is plausibly pervasive.
Kahan’s research does raise an important question, however: how do unfounded 
beliefs about matters of empirical fact become signals of coalitional membership 
and loyalty to begin with? Once again, there is surely no single factor that explains 
the emergence of such associations. For example, one distressing suggestion in 
this area is that beliefs that perform such signalling functions are inherently biased 
towards implausibility, both because out‑group members have no evidential reason 
to hold such beliefs and because the reputational damage associated with believing 
absurdities generates a costlier—and so more reliable—signal of coalitional loyalty 
(Simler and Hanson 2017; Tooby 2017). A distinct causal pathway that plausibly 
plays an important role in the political domain, however, is the phenomenon of solu-
tion aversion, the process by which one denies the existence of a problem because 
one dislikes its available solutions (Campbell and Kay 2014).
Consider climate change again. It is widely held that solving the problems created 
by anthropogenic climate change requires various kinds of market regulation and 
thus government intervention. Given this, those who are invested in a political ideol‑
ogy that condemns extensive governmental interference in the economy acquire a 
motivation to deny that the relevant problem exists. As a result, denial of the prob‑
lem becomes an entrenched position among those who hold the relevant ideology. 
And—again—this is not restricted to climate change, and it is an issue that can arise 
in any ideology. Just as an alcoholic might be in denial about the extent of her alco‑
hol problem because she is averse to the obvious solution to this problem (Pickard 
2016, p. 290), ideologies that condemn certain kinds of actions can motivate denial 
of any problems that would require such actions as solutions. Further, such denial 
is perfectly instrumentally rational from the ideologue’s point of view: if one has 
little practical incentive to hold true beliefs, the benefits of indulging one’s ideologi‑
cal prejudices can overcome the negligible personal costs of ignorance. As Caplan 
(2007, p. 18) puts it, “In real‑world political settings, the price of ideological loyalty 
is essentially zero.”
As these examples illustrate, then, focusing on rational motivated ignorance helps 
to illuminate such phenomena. That is, in many of these cases individuals appear to 
be responding to the costs of knowledge itself, rather than to the costs of acquiring 
knowledge—and, moreover, they are doing so in a way that is perfectly (practically) 
rational. Nevertheless, such individual rationality is socially catastrophic: whilst the 
individual costs of individual ignorance might be vanishingly small, the social costs 
of collective ignorance are enormous.
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Of course, this topic warrants substantially more research in the future, both ana‑
lytical and empirical. For example, in some cases it is clear that powerful individu‑
als and institutions have a more direct interest in denialism (for example, oil com‑
panies in the case of climate change), and they likely also play an important role in 
deliberately fostering associations between certain coalitions and unjustified beliefs 
(Levy 2019). Further, some forms of denial in the political sphere are plausibly not 
tied to coalitional identity or political ideology at all but rather reflect a more gen‑
eral human tendency to avoid recognising problems that generate anxiety (Marshall 
2014, p. 228).
More generally, future work should expand upon and scrutinise two major aspects 
of the foregoing analysis. First, although I have focused on identity and ideologi‑
cal investment as core motivations for ignorance among voters, these clearly do not 
exhaust the complex motivations in this area. Future research would thus benefit 
from a more exhaustive analysis of the motivational drivers of politically relevant 
ignorance. Second, although I have followed thinkers such as Caplan (2007) and 
Kahan (2013, 2017a) in arguing that non‑epistemic motivations play a significant 
role in sustaining voter ignorance, there are competing explanations of at least some 
of the phenomena identified in this section. For example, alternative explanations of 
the correlations between political identity and ignorance point to things such as the 
different informational environments that people inhabit, and their general depend‑
ence on complex chains of testimony in which in‑group membership is often used 
as a guide to trustworthiness (Levy 2019). Although adjudicating between such 
competing explanations is a live area of research in the social sciences (Lelkes et al. 
2018), future work that attempts to ground voter ignorance in motivated ignorance 
in the manner that I have done here must deal more extensively with competing 
accounts of this complex phenomenon.
Finally, it should be obvious that the phenomena described in this section by no 
means exhaust the ways in which rational motivated ignorance can be collectively 
harmful. For example, I have already noted the work of feminist philosophers and 
critical philosophers of race who have drawn attention to the way in which mem‑
bers of elite and powerful demographic groups wilfully avoid—and, more generally, 
benefit from ignorance of—aspects of the lives of oppressed groups in society (see, 
e.g., Mills 2007), and Moody‑Adams (1999, p. 180) argues that “the main obsta‑
cle to moral progress in social practices” in general “is the tendency to widespread 
affected ignorance of what can and should already be known.” Thus, although 
my focus has been on simple kinds of voter ignorance, studying the way in which 
rational motivated ignorance can have socially harmful—even catastrophic—effects 
is a much broader topic. I hope that the present work will contribute to the analytic 
foundations of this project and future research within it.
5  Conclusion
In this paper I have sought to clarify a pervasive and important phenomenon: cases 
in which individuals remain ignorant not because of a lack of available informa‑
tion, and not because of the various costs associated with acquiring that information, 
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but because of the costs associated with knowledge itself. I have sought to illumi‑
nate the circumstances in which this phenomenon is instrumentally rational, and I 
have argued that rational motivated ignorance plays a large but often underappreci‑
ated role in one of the most pernicious and socially consequential forms of igno‑
rance today: ignorance among voters in contemporary democracies. As I have noted 
throughout, this paper leaves many important questions unanswered. Nevertheless, I 
hope that it has drawn attention to a set of issues that warrant more attention in phi‑
losophy and that it has taken some important steps in addressing them. To conclude, 
I want to flag two important implications of the paper.
First, and most obviously, the phenomenon of ignorance cannot be understood 
through a purely epistemological lens. We are not impartial seekers of knowledge, 
even if it often seems that way to us. We are social animals whose orientation to 
knowledge is fundamentally strategic. Knowledge is risky. It threatens our com‑
forting illusions, undermines our wishful thinking, drives us towards undesirable 
actions and destabilises the social relationships that we depend upon for meaning 
and belonging. Insofar as motivated ignorance is a significant feature of human life, 
then, ignorance in general cannot be understood without focusing on a variety of 
highly practical considerations: the contingencies of our circumstances and moti‑
vations, and the structure of the social worlds that we inhabit. Of course, this is a 
central lesson of the work on ignorance by feminist philosophers and critical phi‑
losophers of race (Frye 1983; Mills 2007; Woomer 2019). I hope that the current 
paper reinforces it.
Second, and relatedly, the foregoing considerations suggest powerful lessons for 
how to address ignorance. An intuitive view is that the answer to socially perni‑
cious forms of ignorance is to provide people with more information, perhaps com‑
bined with an appeal to their reason. This is unlikely to help when ignorance is 
motivated. Such ignorance is not caused by a lack of available information, and in 
many cases the problem is precisely that individuals are treating potential knowl‑
edge in a way that is rational. Instead, one has to address the root of the problem: 
the practical considerations that make knowledge costly for individuals. In cases in 
which ungrounded beliefs are signals of coalitional identity, for example, the task 
must consist of attempting to depoliticise such issues—to show that one can main‑
tain one’s membership in a desirable coalition without renouncing a commitment to 
knowledge, perhaps by encouraging influential in‑group members to adopt a dissent‑
ing view (Nyhan 2013). Similarly, insofar as solution aversion is an important cause 
of denial in the political domain, it suggests that public information campaigns 
should work hard to decouple the recognition of problems from a specification of 
available solutions (see, e.g., Kahan et al. 2012). More generally, solving the prob‑
lems associated with motivated ignorance requires a far more complex and demand‑
ing set of individual and collective strategies—strategies that can only be identified, 
let alone executed, with a proper understanding of the practical incentives that peo‑
ple have for burying their heads in the sand.
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